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The objective of this paper is to defend the non-reductive thesis of phenomenal consciousness. This paper will give an 
overview of the arguments for the non-reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness and justify why the 
reductionist approach is implausible in the context of explaining phenomenal subjective experience. The debate between 
reductionist and non-reductionist on the project of Demystifying and Mystifying phenomenal consciousness is driven by 
two fundamental assumptions-1) Reductive-Naturalistic Objectivism, 2) Phenomenal Realism. There are several 
arguments for the irreducibility of phenomenal consciousness; this paper will focus on the inverted spectrum argument, 
knowledge argument, and the conceivability argument. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consciousness is the most familiar thing for 
the subject in the universe; at the same time, it is the 
most mysterious thing [1]. Reductionist has insufficient 
knowledge about its localization and function. It is an 
open secret issue [2] of humanity and becomes the 
biggest mystery for both science and philosophy from 
the last couple of decades. Descartes pointed out that it 
is the clearest and distinct idea for the subject to be 
absolutely certain about its existence. 
 
In this paper, we are going to discuss about 
one aspect of consciousness-phenomenal 
consciousness. We will be dealing with the question in 
 
1 
Chalmers (1995, p.3) 
2 
It is the most familiar thing in the universe for the 
subject because of its peculiar characteristics of 
indubitableness, subjective certainty and objective truth. 
At the same time, it’s origin (Chalmers called it the hard 
problem of consciousness- “how consciousness 
emerges/arises from neurophysiological states of the 
brain and why it exists at all”) has been an open 
question from the beginning of evolution till now and 
remains unsolvable mystery. It’s the most fundamental 
problem of human civilisation for us need to be 
addressed irrespective of different discipline. 
this paper i.e., what is phenomenal consciousness? Is It 
real or an illusion? Can reductive physicalism explain 
it? Is It possible that what we are directly aware of can 
be a deception? Can phenomenal consciousness be 
reductively explained? In order to answer these 
questions, there are two prominent groups 
(reductionism and non-reductionism) take part in the 
debate. The debate between reductionist and non- 
reductionist has been gradually getting more attention 
within the philosophical community. For eliminative 
reductionism, there is no such thing as phenomenal 
consciousness; it is a misleading term frequently used 
by some philosopher on the influence of primitive ideas 
of mysticism. Daniel Dennett, one of the leading 
philosophers of contemporary eliminativists, claims that 
"phenomenal consciousness are scientifically 
unsupportable and deeply misleading,” [3] there is no 
phenomenal consciousness exist separately from the 
brain activities. He has rejected the first-person 
authority of the agents on their mental facts which is the 
foundation of non-reductive theories of consciousness. 
 
Phenomenal consciousness is the subjective 
phenomenal states of the living being, which can be 
accessible to that specific living being only. It is the 
 
3 
see BaBler (2015, p.2) 
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inner qualitative character of experience neither 
reducible to mechanical or functional states nor 
intentional states of experience. Each qualitative, 
subjective character of experiences are different from 
each other; for example, every sensory experience (i.e., 
fragrance of rose, the teste of sweet, etc.) are different 
from each other and have unique kind of qualitative 
properties associated with every conscious experience. 
The qualitative properties of sensory experiences are 
also different from the non-sensory qualitative 
properties of experiences. In every mental state or 
conscious experiences, the qualitative feature of 
experience [4] always associated, which is inevitable 
for a conscious being. 
 
If we look at the history of philosophy of mind, 
then we can find that the debate between the 
reductionist and non-reductionist camp is primarily 
based on the view that how consciousness will fit in the 
physical laws of the universe? Whether mental states 
can be explained only through the functional states or is 
there something extra ingredient which cannot be 
definable through the laws of physics? what is the role 
of consciousness in the life of an organism? How it 
emerges from the physical mechanism so and so forth. 
Reductionist holds that mental states (thoughts, 
feelings, emotions, happiness, and sensation so and so 
forth) are somehow identical to brain states or its 
functional states. For an eliminative reductionist, there 
is no such thing as phenomenal consciousness, though it 
seems to exist. Daniel Dennett holds the view that 
phenomenal consciousness is an illusion. As he pointed 
out that 
" I want to make it as just as uncomfortable for anyone 
to talk of phenomenal consciousness-or "raw feels" or 
"phenomenal properties or "qualitative and intrinsic 
properties" or "the qualitative character" of experience 
–with the presupposition that they, and everyone else, 
know what they are talking about…far better, tactically, 
to declare that there simply are no phenomenal 
consciousness at all [5]”. 
 
There is no such thing exists as phenomenal 
consciousness, which can be objectively verifiable. The 
human brain is just a living brain; only activities of the 
brain exist. He also claims that it is a primitive idea 
prevailed by some philosopher till now, like a magician 
tricks the audience through the power of illusion in such 
a way that the audiences are convinced to accept it as 
real, like that some philosopher mislead people through 
some Jugglery words to accept as if there is such a thing 
called phenomenal consciousness which exist 
independent of brain functions. He has given some 
arguments to establish his position, i.e., deflationary 
theory, illusion arguments. 
On the other hand, there are some 
contemporary philosophers like David Chalmers, John 
Searle, Thomas Nagel, Donald D. Hoffman, etc. argues 
in support of irreducibility of phenomenal 
consciousness that phenomenal consciousness cannot 
be explained in terms of the reductionist framework. 
Generally, there are three popular arguments against 
reductionist theory of consciousness. These are 
knowledge argument (K.A), conceivability Argument 
(C.A), inverted spectrum argument. In every conscious 
experience, there are some subjective raw feels exist, 
though there is objectively observable function going on 
in the brain of the subject at the time of experience. 
One can measure objectively the functions of the brain 
that is how the brain works, which part of the brain is 
responsible for which kind of function and which 
neuron plays which role in order to generate experience, 
can answer the question like-what is function of a 
particular sense organ and what is a particular sensory 
experience represents, However, what cannot be 
objectively accessible is the subjective qualitative 
experience or phenomenal consciousness. 
 
Arguments for Phenomenal consciousness 
There are several arguments which give a 
rational foundation for believing that phenomenal 
consciousness is the primordial thing for a living being, 
which cannot be explained from a third-person 
perspective. We are going to look at some general 
argument in this paper. Let us critically analyses some  
of the popular arguments. 
 
Inverted spectrum argument 
This argument was developed by Ned block 
and shoemaker against functionalism (in the strong 
sense) which claims that all mental states are equivalent 
to functional states. Ned Block has made the distinction 
between phenomenal consciousness and access 
consciousness [6], which prevents us from designating 
him as a strong functionalist [ 7]. As David Chalmers 
observes "it is possible that a system might make 
precisely the same color discriminations that I do, but 
that when confronted by red objects it has the kind of 
experience that I have when confronted by blue objects. 
Further, the philosopher argues that this might happen 
even when the systems are functionally isomorphic. If 
this argument succeeds, then even if the appropriate 
functional organization suffices for the existence of 
conscious experiences, it does not determine their 
specific nature. Instead, the specific nature of 
experiences must be dependent on non-organizational 
properties, such as specific neurophysiological 
properties [8].” There may be two functionally identical 
systems but have different qualitative phenomenal 
consciousness. It is possible that person X and person Y 
having the same verbal report of their experience of the 
color red, but their subjective inner experience could be 
 
  
4 
See, Sahu Manas Kumar (2019, pp.78-80) 
Qualia and Intentionality for more details. 
5 
Dennett (1988, p.1) 
6 
Block (2008) Vol.108, pp.289-317 
7 
Ibid, (1995) Vol.18, No.2, pp.227-247 
8 
Chalmers (1995, p.2) 
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inverted. When the person X saw red color has a 
subjective experience, which is identical to the person 
Y's experience of yellow and vice versa. Though person 
X and Y have the same color discrimination capacity, it 
is possible that their inner experience of color inversion 
might happen in their brain. This color inversion cannot 
be detected by reductionist (especially behaviorist, 
neuropsychologist, functionalist and so on) Because 
they can only explain about the objective function of 
the brain's color discrimination capacity of the creature 
but what they are lacking is the knowledge of the direct 
accessibility of the subjective inner experiences of that 
creature. There is something like to be that creature [9]. 
It is possible that the external behavior of two biological 
systems may be the same, but the qualitative 
experiences might be different [10]. Even if we 
completely understand the function of the brain, we 
cannot be able to give a satisfactory account of 
phenomenal consciousness in the reductionist approach 
[11]. 
 
Conceivability argument 
Rene Descartes had used this argument to 
establish his mind-body dualism. Later the argument 
has redefined to support the non-reductive theory of 
mind by Saul Kripke and David Chalmers. The 
underlying essence of the argument is that the 
possibility of metaphysical gap will be a threat for 
reductionist thesis. David Chalmers's zombies thought 
experiment and Saul Kraske's rigid designators are the 
advanced forms of the conceivability argument. 
 
The argument is grounded on the idea of 
physical necessity and metaphysical possibility. it 
defends the view of the irreducibility of phenomenal 
consciousness by claiming that conceivability entails 
metaphysical possibility. The argument is, if X is 
conceivable then there is no problem for believing its 
existence in the possible world, because there is no 
logical contradiction in the idea that X could exist in the 
possible world. David Chalmers argues that there can 
be philosophical zombies, which are behaviorally and 
functionally identical to human beings, however, lack 
the phenomenal consciousness. He argues that there is 
no logical contradiction in the conceivability of 
philosophical zombies, who act or behave like human 
being and have the identical function of the human 
brain but unable to have phenomenal qualitative 
properties of experience. Though it is not possible in the 
real world because it is go against the laws of nature or 
physical necessity of the world, but there is no logical 
contradiction in the idea of philosophical zombies (like 
hare's horn, round-square, sky flower and so on). The 
metaphysical existential possibility of philosophical 
zombies cannot be ruled out. The logical possibility of 
zombies entails its existence in the metaphysical world 
though not in the real world. His main concern was not 
 
9 
Nagel (1972), pp.435-450) 
10 
Jackson (1986, pp.291-295) 
11 
Chalmers (2003, pp.102-142) 
to argue whether there are zombies exist in the real 
world or not, but the metaphysical possibilities of their 
existence. The argument of the Zombies Thought 
Experiment is 
1) If Philosophical zombies are conceivable, then 
their existence is metaphysically possible. 
(Conceivability entails metaphysical possibility) 
2) If their existence is metaphysically possible, then 
reductionism is false. (mere possibility of a physical 
organism devoid of consciousness implies the 
irreducibility of consciousness.) 
3) Philosophical zombies are at least conceivable and 
existence of zombies is metaphysically possible 
4) Therefore, reductionism is false 
 
KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT 
There is another knockdown argument against 
reductionist thesis, quite popular among philosopher, 
known as knowledge argument. There are several forms 
of knowledge argument developed in the contemporary 
philosophy of mind. We will limit ourselves within 
Nagel and Jackson's form of knowledge argument. 
 
What Is It Like To Be a Bat 
The famous article "What is it like to be a bat?" 
by Thomas Nagel that knowing the physiological 
structure of an organism is not enough for knowing all 
the facts about that organism. There are certain facts 
which cannot be put within the category of physical fact 
because both of them belong to different categories. 
The non-physical facts of experience neither can be 
reduced to nor can be explained objectively due to the 
limitation of an organism and inaccessibility of the 
subjective aspect of others mental life. Jackson has 
explained in his article that "I want to know what it is 
like for a bat to be a bat. If I try to imagine this, I am 
restricted to the resources of my mind, and those 
resources are inadequate to the task. I cannot perform 
it either by imagining additions to my present 
experience, or by imagining segments gradually 
subtracted from it, or by imagining some combination 
of additions, subtractions, and modifications [12]". 
 
Nagel tries to establish the point here is that 
everything cannot be explained through the framework 
of reductionism. Human cognition cannot be grasped 
the subjective inner experience of an organism. "We 
may ascribe general types of experience on the basis of 
the animal's structure and behavior. Thus, we describe 
bat sonar as a form of three-dimensional forward 
perception; we believe that bats feel some versions of 
pain, fear, hunger, and lust and that they have other, 
more familiar types of perception besides sonar. 
However, we believe that these experiences also have in 
each case a specific subjective character, which it is 
beyond our ability to conceive [13].” The subjective 
 
12 
Nagel (1974, p.439) 
13 
Ibid. p.439 
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inner experience of a bat cannot be explained by merely 
the physiological study of the bat. A neurophysiologist 
can give all the information about the physiological 
construction of a bat, how their brain works, which part 
of the brain of a bat is responsible for the echolocation 
so and so forth but what any of us could not do is 
experience the mental life (David Chalmers called it the 
inner movie of an organism) of a bat. Because all the 
information is not physical information. There is 
something beyond the objective explanation of 
physicalism, which is only accessible to the subject who 
is having that experience. 
 
What Mary Did Not Know 
Mary is a neurophysiologist who never 
experienced color, except black and white before, but 
knows all the physical facts about color that - how the 
electromagnetic wavelength works, about the functional 
role of color in the human brain, so and so forth. when 
she encounters with a red object, will learn something 
new knowledge about the color red that "what it is like 
to experience the color red", which she was lacking 
during her neurophysiological study about the color red. 
She was not aware about the experience of phenomenal 
qualities of color red though she knows all the physical 
facts about the red color before her release. Jackson 
argues that knowledge of the functional role of the mind 
is not enough for knowing about the experience of color 
altogether. "Mary is not that, despite her fantastic grasp 
of neurophysiology and everything else physical, she 
could not imagine what it is like to sense red; it is that 
she would not know. But if physicalism is true, she 
would know; and no great powers of imagination would 
be called for [14]." Before her release, Mary knows 
everything about the color vision and the objective 
function of the brain but was not aware of the subjective 
qualitative feature of the color red. "The knowledge 
Mary lacked which is of particular point for the 
knowledge argument against Physicalism is knowledge 
about the experiences of others, not about her own. 
When she is let out, she has new experiences, color 
experiences she has never had before [15]”. 
 
The argument form of Mary Room Thought Experiment 
is 
1) Mary (before her release) knew all the physical 
information about color vision (what the best color 
vision scientist can ever know), but never experience 
color (Complete Knowledge Claim) 
(2) Mary (after her release) learn something new fact 
about the color vision, which she lacked despite her 
expertise on neurophysiology. (Learning Claim) 
Therefore, 
(3) There are some facts of color vision which escapes 
from the Physicalist explanation. (Non-Deducibility 
Claim) [16] 
From the Mary’s room thought experiment it is clear 
that 
 
1) If Mary knows all the physical facts about 
color vision but lacks phenomenal information, then her 
knowledge about color vision is incomplete and 
phenomenal information does not belong to physical 
information. 
 
2) Mary knew all the physical information 
(what a best theoretical physicist can ever know), but 
her knowledge about color vision could not tell her 
anything about phenomenal information. It is quite 
contradictory for physicalist (those who accepts all 
information are physical information) to accept that 
marry knows all the physical information, but her 
knowledge is incomplete due to lack of phenomenal 
information. Because to argue that X has complete 
knowledge about Y, however, unable to identify a 
property of Y is a contradictory idea. If X knows all the 
information about Y completely, then he/she will not 
miss any information about Y. it challenges the 
fundamental concept of physicalist that all information 
is physical information. 
 
3) Therefore, there is something about the 
color vision which is not contained by Mary's 
physicalist theory of knowledge of color experience and 
the physicalist assumption that all information are 
physical information become false. What Mary was 
lacking in spite of knowing all the physical facts about 
color was the phenomenal information ("what is it like 
to experience color," subjective qualitative raw feels 
about color, what is it like to experience redness of red, 
greenness of green, etc.). 
 
Reductionist Responses to Knowledge Argument 
The knowledge argument has become 
controversial from a long time ago. Physicalist deferred 
in their standpoint in response to the argument. 
Generally, physicalist can be categorized broadly into 
two groups, namely thick and thin materialism [17]. If 
Mary knows all the physical facts of color vision, then 
she will definitely make the right predictions about the 
sensory data about color and will not surprise in her 
after released experiences [18]. Dennett argues that if 
premise one is true then premise two must be false 
because knowing all the physical facts about color 
vision means knowing everything about color vision. 
By knowing the physical effects and causes of color 
vision Mary definitely will be able to figure out what 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
Jackson (1986, p.292) 
15 
Ibid. p.292 
16 
Hence all information is physical information became 
false. 
17 
See Chalmers (2002, pp.247-55) for detailed analysis. 
18 
See Dennett (2017, pp.1-8), and (2006, pp.15-31) 
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supporter of knowledge argument called what it is like 
to experience color [19]. 
 
A question may arise here that in order to have 
phenomenal experience of color, do we really need the 
direct access of color or can the phenomenal experience 
of color is possible without the experience of color red? 
In fact, those who endorse simulation theory can claim 
that the same phenomenal experience of color can be 
generated through simulation without direct access to 
the content of experience i.e. color red. If there is no 
need for content of experience to generate phenomenal 
experience, then Mary knows what it is like to 
experience red before her release [20]. 
 
The possibility of environmental stimuli 
replacement cannot be denied, however, generating 
experience through direct access to the perceptual 
content and generating the experience by the help of 
stimulation will be different all together. In both cases, 
the role of neurophysiological substances may be 
identical, however, will generate different experience 
altogether. In the first case the subject will have the 
self-awareness about the perceptual content entangled 
with the phenomenal subjective experience whereas in 
the latter case, no such thing is possible. 
 
Non-propositional Knowledge 
Unlike Dennett, the second category of 
physicalism accept that Mary learns something about 
color vision after her release, however the knowledge 
she got was not propositional knowledge (certain 
information of experience) about the color experience 
but a non- propositional knowledge [21]. The 
proponents of this argument claim that propositional 
knowledge (knowing that) is not the same as non-
propositional knowledge (knowing how). What Mary 
learn was non- propositional knowledge about color 
vision. Mary, before her release, aware about the 
possibility of 
 
19 
Dennett’s (2006, pp.14-29) objection to knowledge 
argument can be a threat for weaker (earlier) version of 
the knowledge argument only, however, K.A can be 
protected from Dennett's attack by modifying the 
argument. The phenomenal realist can counter the 
Dennett's response by revising the knowledge argument 
that Mary before her release, knows all most all the 
physical information what a neurophysiologist can 
know through theoretical studies of color vision. 
20 
Torin (2008, pp. 247-50) 
21 
There is a common agreement between ability 
hypothesis and acquaintance hypothesis on the non- 
propositional knowledge. D. Lewis (1983 Vol.12, 
pp.112-133), (1988 vol.13, pp.29–57) and Nemirow 
(1980), (1990), (2007) criticized the knowledge 
argument by advocating the ability hypothesis. Conee’s 
(1994) attack is based on acquaintance hypothesis. Tye 
(2000), (2009 p.113) reformulate the acquaintance 
hypothesis, Mellor (1993), and Meyer (2001) argues in 
support of ability hypothesis. 
phenomenal subjective knowledge of experience 
indirectly. She lacked only certain abilities/ 
acquaintance property of experience because of which 
she could not gain phenomenal information directly. 
(ability hypothesis). There are two kinds of non- 
propositional claim a) acquaintance hypothesis b) 
ability hypothesis, 
 
The proponent of acquaintance hypothesis 
argues that the phenomenal subjective experience of 
color is directly supereminence on the acquaintance of 
color experience. Mary before her release, was never 
acquainted with color red that’s why she lacks the 
acquaintance property of color experience. 
 
Ability hypothesis accepts the premises of 
knowledge argument; however, it rejects the conclusion 
that Mary will gain a new knowledge about color 
vision. Though it partially agrees with K.A that she 
lacked certain information before experiencing color 
red, but that is not phenomenal or factual knowledge 
(propositional knowledge) rather she acquires certain 
abilities which are come under category of non- 
propositional knowledge. When Mary sees the red color 
for the first time, she will gain certain abilities (i.e., 
remembering, recognizing, and making predictions) 
instead of new knowledge or concepts [22]. 
Phenomenal knowledge without ability is possible, 
however, ability without phenomenal knowledge is not 
possible. Mary not only gain certain new ability but also 
learns new fact about Color. (a phenomenal realist can 
accept the ability hypothesis claim that she gains certain 
new ability without accepting the claim that abilities are 
identical with the phenomenal knowledge). The 
knowledge argument can also be defended against 
ability hypothesis by claiming that Mary not only gain 
certain imaginative ability rather something new along 
with the complex ability [23]. 
 
Common Agreement of K.A and C.A 
knowledge argument and the conceivability 
argument rely on three common ideas despite of 
different stands on intersubjectivity.  
 
Explanatory Gap: - There is an explanatory gap 
between phenomenal consciousness or phenomenal 
consciousness and physical structure of the brain, which 
is a big challenge for any reductionist theory of mind. 
They have a mutual agreement on the view that there is 
an explanatory gap between physical information and 
phenomenal information; physical information is 
insufficient for explanation of phenomenal subjective 
experience. Hence there is something beyond the realm 
of physical information. (physical information 
phenomenal information). No amount of physical 
fact/knowledge of experience can explain “what is it 
 
22 
For Comprehensive Analysis See Nemirow (2007 
pp.490-499) “So This is What it's Like: A Defense of 
The Ability Hypothesis” 
23 
See Torin Alter (2008, pp.229-39) 
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like to be in certain mental states” because of the 
inaccessibility of mental content by others. Phenomenal 
concept/knowledge is a priori irreducible form physical 
facts/concepts/knowledge of experience. 
 
Ontological Gap 
One can easily infer the ontological gap from 
the possibility of epistemic gap. In Jackson's knowledge 
argument, Mary knows (after her release) that there is 
something about the color experience which she lacked 
(before her release) in spite of knowing all the physical 
facts/knowledge about the color vision. It leads to her to 
infer that there are certain non-physical facts about 
color experience, which is out of the realm of 
physicalist explanation. The epistemic gap implies the 
possibility of a metaphysical gap. Therefore, there is no 
inconsistency in the idea that there is a metaphysical 
gap which physicalists were failed to deal with. The 
conceivability argument (C.A) has a quite similar view 
that the metaphysical possibility of zombies is 
irrefutable. 
 
Inconsistency with Reductive Physicalism 
Both of the arguments share the common idea 
that physicalism is inconsistent with phenomenal 
information. Physicalist either try to deny the possibility 
of phenomenal information or reduced to physical 
information which is not acceptable to both 
C.A and K.A. The physicalist also accepts that the mere 
possibility of the metaphysical gap implies the falsity of 
physicalism. The debate on the phenomenal and 
subjective aspect of the experience with physicalist has 
become a classic and overwhelming issue. 
 
Phenomenal Concept Strategy 
Phenomenal concepts are constructed by the 
conscious agent through the introspection of 
phenomenal experience. Hence, they are experience 
dependent. In order to explain the phenomenal 
experience, we use certain concepts which are distinct 
from other physical concepts named as Phenomenal 
Concept. The construction of a particular phenomenal 
concept by the subject is possible when the subject 
undergone a certain type of experience from which the 
acquisition of particular phenomenal concept about the 
content of experience became possible. The 
phenomenal concept strategy supporters [24], unlike 
type A materialist (eliminativists), acknowledge that 
there is an explanatory gap [25] between phenomenality 
of experience and physical basis of experience (accept 
knowledge claim and learning claim of knowledge 
argument), however, they oppose the conclusion of 
 
24 
Lora (1997), Stoljar (2005), Papineau (2006), and 
Carruthers & Veillet (2007) are the proponents of 
Phenomenal Concept Strategy. 
25 
The proponent of phenomenal concept strategy 
(P.C.S) used the term Explanatory Gap in a special 
sense which is completely different from Usage of non- 
physicalist explanation of Explanatory Gap. 
knowledge argument. The anti-materialist explanation 
of phenomenal concepts as nonphysical property is 
misleading. The phenomenal concepts can be explained 
through the computational mechanism of the brain that 
how the particular events of the neural processes are 
responsible for generating these phenomenal concepts 
[26]. 
 
Phenomenal concepts are purely recognitional 
[27] generated only through the acquaintance with the 
object of experience. The knowledge of phenomenal 
experience of color red for instances is only possible, 
when there is the possibility of deploying that specific 
phenomenal concept of red, which is constructed 
through prior experience. As we have seen in the 
conceivability argument that Mary lacked the 
phenomenal experience of red before her release not 
because she lacked the non-physical and irreducible fact 
about color in the anti-physicalist term, because she was 
conceptually isolated from the phenomenal concept 
about the experience of color red. Each phenomenal 
concept is tied with a particular type of experience, the 
change in phenomenal experience cause the change in 
phenomenal concepts. The inseparability of 
phenomenal concepts from experience establish the fact 
the anti-physicalist arguments are misleading. 
 
The response of phenomenal concept strategy 
to anti-physicalist arguments is implausible, as David 
Chalmers argues that in order to bridge the explanatory 
gap, it invites another explanatory gap between 
neurophysiological processes and phenomenal 
concepts. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The debate between reductionist and non- 
reductionist camp on phenomenal consciousness 
grounded on the primary assumptions that everything in 
the universe can be explained either in terms of 
physicalist mechanism or non-physical explanation of 
reality. These are the two approach which prevails from 
the beginning of philosophy. The anti-physicalist 
arguments have the problem of establishing their 
knowledge claim without giving the physical basis for 
evaluation to physicalist, which might be a possible 
way to resolve the issue. On the other hand, physicalist 
mechanism has this biasness that everything can be 
reduced to matter or representational properties of 
experience. The job of a naturalist is just to give a 
mechanistic explanation of the world through reduction 
to matter. The common agreement between anti- 
physicalist arguments on the explanatory gap is an 
initial challenge for any reductionist thesis in the first 
place which must be addressed before having a theory 
of consciousness. it is an uncontroversial claim that 
phenomenal consciousness secures the ground for 
subjective certainty of knowledge, however, as Ned 
 
26 
See Papineau (2006, pp.111-44) 
27 
See Carruthers & Veillet (2007, pp. 215-17) 
Manas Kumar Sahu; J Adv Educ Philos, April, 2020; 4(4): 160-166 
166 © 2020 |Published by Scholars Middle East Publishers, Dubai, United Arab Emirates 
 
 
Block pointed out, there is a potential threat in this 
approach which may lead towards solipsistic world 
view. In other words, though it secured the ground for 
subjective certainty, might be failed to address the 
harder problem, as we have seen in the case of 
foundationalism. 
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